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1 Introduction
Consider a situation where we need to choose optimal one(s) among several alternative policies which
will affect inﬁnitely many future generations as well as the present generation (e.g. environmental
policies). If we are concerned only with each generation’s welfare measured in terms of utility, we
can deal with such an intergenerational decision problem by using a social welfare relation (SWR),
a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation, deﬁned on inﬁnite utility streams.1 In exploring the SWRs
which will be acceptable not only for the present generation but also for future generations, two basic
principles are usually considered. One is Strong Pareto, the axiom of efﬁciency, and the other is Finite
Anonymity, the axiom of impartiality, which asserts that two utility streams related by permuting ﬁnitely
many generations are socially indifferent. It is known that these two basic axioms together are equivalent
to the inﬁnite-horizon variant of the well-known justice principle called Suppes-Sen grading principle.2
Although this justice principle “does squeeze out as much as possible out of the use of dominance
(or vector inequality)” (Sen (1970), p.151), as argued by Asheim and Tungodden (2004), there still
be at least two problems to be resolved. One is that what the Suppes-Sen grading principle by itself
asserts on the intergenerational decision-making may be insufﬁcient to resolve distributional conﬂicts
among generations in many cases, and the other is that Finite Anonymity is too weak to realize impartial
treatment of inﬁnitely many generations in a satisfactory manner.
To resolve the former issue, i.e. the problem of distributional conﬂicts among generations, Asheim
and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al. (2007) examine the possibility of additionally imposing a
consequentialist equity requirement. Asheim and Tungodden (2004) examine the case of adding the
inﬁnite-horizon variant of Hammond Equity and show that the two versions of the leximin principle are
characterized in terms of Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, Hammond Equity, and one of two alternative
preference-continuity axioms. Bossert et al. (2007) consider not only the case of adding Hammond
Equity but also the case of imposing the weaker equity axiom called Pigou-Dalton Equity. They charac-
1Some readers may think that a complete SWR, i.e. social welfare ordering (SWO), is more desirable since it can compare
any two utility streams. Nevertheless, a non-complete SWR is sufﬁcient even to determine a unique optimal policy in some
economic models (see, for example, Mitra (2005) and Basu and Mitra (2007)). Moreover, as will be shown later, using Arrow’s
(1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930) theorem, our results stated in terms of a SWR ensure the existence of the SWO that respects
the comparisons by the SWR in question in an inconstructive way.
2On this, see Svennson (1980) and Asheim et al. (2001). The Suppes-Sen grading principle is originally deﬁned in the
ﬁnite population setting. For details, we refer the reader to Suppes (1966) and Sen (1970).
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terize the inﬁnite-horizon generalized Lorenz criterion in terms of Strong Pareto, Finite Anonymity, and
Pigou-Dalton Equity and also show that the inﬁnite-horizon leximin principle is characterized if Pigou-
Dalton Equity is strengthened to Hammond Equity.3 These existing characterizations surely provide the
possibility of equitable resolutions to distributional conﬂicts among generations.
The purpose of this paper is to explore a further resolution beyond those established in Asheim
and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al. (2007) by not only adding the equity axiom, Pigou-Dalton
Equity or Hammond Equity, but also strengthening the impartiality requirement in the strongly Pare-
tian and ﬁnitely anonymous SWRs to resolve the latter issue mentioned above, i.e. the weakness
of Finite Anonymity, as well. Since, as shown in van Liedekerke (1995) and Lauwers (1997a), the
axiom of Strong Anonymity deﬁned by all logically possible permutations of inﬁnitely many gen-
erations inevitably comes in conﬂict with Strong Pareto, we must consider the intermediate between
Finite Anonymity and Strong Anonymity. In this paper, we focus on the anonymity axiom called Q-
Anonymity. Q-Anonymity was ﬁrst introduced in Lauwers (1997b) by the name Fixed Step Anonymity.4
Q-Anonymity is deﬁned in terms not only of ﬁnite permutations but also of inﬁnite but cyclic permu-
tations, and thus it is logically stronger than Finite Anonymity but weaker than Strong Anonymity. In
their recent paper, Mitra and Basu (2007) show thatQ-Anonymity is compatible with Strong Pareto and,
moreover, that the class of permutations considered inQ-Anonymity is the largest class of permutations
in terms of which the anonymity axiom that is compatible with Strong Pareto is well-deﬁned.5 In the
subsequent sections, we examine the possibility of imposingQ-Anonymity on the strongly Paretian and
equitable SWRs.
The results obtained in this paper are positive. We deﬁne the extensions of the generalized Lorenz
and the leximin SWRs, called Q-generalized Lorenz criterion and Q-leximin principle respectively, in
the same way as Banerjee (2006a) does for the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs. Then, we show
that each of theQ-generalized Lorenz criterion and theQ-leximin principle is well-deﬁned as a SWR on
inﬁnite utility streams and that the former is characterized by Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and Pigou-
Dalton Equity and the latter in terms of Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity and Hammond Equity.
3The logical relationship among the two versions of the leximin principles characterized by Asheim and Tungodden (2004)
and the leximin principle in Bossert et al. (2007) is the same as the one among the chatching-up criterion, the overtaking
criterion, and the utilitarian SWR. For the latter three SWRs, we refer the reader to Basu and Mitra (2007).
4See also Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
5In this paper, the term “anonymity axiom” is used to refer to the condition which asserts that two utility streams related by
a permutation of a certain class must be socially indifferent.
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As we brieﬂy noted above, theQ-anonymous extension of a ﬁnitely anonymous SWR is already pro-
posed by Banerjee (2006a) for the Suppes-Sen and the utilitarian SWRs. He characterizes the extended
Suppes-Sen SWR by Strong Pareto and Q-anonymity and does the extended utilitarian SWR, called
Q-utilitarian SWR, in terms of Strong Pareto, Q-Anonymity, and an informational invariance axiom
called Partial Translation Scale Invariance. In view of Banerjee’s (2006a) results, our characterizations
of the Q-generalized Lorenz and the Q-leximin SWRs are also interpreted as showing the possibility of
adding the equity requirement, Pigou-Dalton Equity or Hammond Equity, in the strongly Paretian and
Q-anonymous SWRs. To make clear the linkage between our analysis focusing on a consequentialist
equity and Banerjee’s (2006a) work, we also provide a new characterization of the Q-utilitarian SWR
focusing on its equity property. We show that the Q-utilitarian SWR is also characterized by Strong
Pareto, Q-Anonymity, and Incremental Equity which is stated for the conﬂicting situations similar to
those considered in Pigou-Dalton Equity and Hammond Equity and requires that any utility transfer
among two generations is socially indifferent. Our characterizations of the Q-generalized Lorenz, the
Q-leximin, and the Q-utilitarian SWRs together tell us how the logically admissible SWRs will change
in accordance with which of the equity axioms, Pigou-Dalton Equity, Hammond Equity, and Incremental
Equity, is additionally imposed on the strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and deﬁnitions. In
Section 3, we provide the axioms we impose on a SWR and the formal deﬁnitions of the Q-generalized
Lorenz criterion and the Q-leximin principle. Then, we state the characterizations of them. Section 4
establishes the characterization of theQ-utilitarian SWR using Incremental Equity. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs are available in Appendix.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Let R denote the set of all real numbers and N the set of all positive integers f1; 2; : : : g. We letX ´ RN
be the domain of inﬁnite utility streams. An inﬁnite-dimensional vector x = (x1; x2; : : : ) is a typical
element of X and xi is interpreted as utility of ith generation for each i 2 N. For all x 2 X and all
n 2 N, we denote (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) by x¡n and (xn+1; xn+2; : : : ) by x+n. Thus, given any x 2 X and
any n 2 N, we can write x = (x¡n; x+n). For all n 2 N and all x 2 X , ¡x¡n(1) ; x¡n(2) ; : : : ; x¡n(n)¢ denote a
4
rank-ordered permutation of x¡n such that x¡n(1) · x¡n(2) · ¢ ¢ ¢ · x¡n(n), ties being broken arbitrarily.
A SWR, %, is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation on X , i.e. a quasi-ordering.6 An asymmetric
component of % is denoted by Â and a symmetric component by » respectively, i.e. x Â y if and only
if x % y holds but y % x does not, and x » y if and only if x % y and y % x. A SWR %A is said to
be a subrelation to a SWR %B if, for all x; y 2 X , (i) x »A y implies x »B y and (ii) x ÂA y implies
x ÂB y.
Following Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), we represent any permutation on the set
of generations N by a permutation matrix. A permutation matrix is an inﬁnite matrix P = (pij)i;j2N
satisfying the following properties:
(i) for each i 2 N, there exists j(i) 2 N such that pij(i) = 1 and pij = 0 for all j 6= j(i);
(ii) for each j 2 N, there exists i(j) 2 N such that pi(j)j = 1 and pij = 0 for all i 6= i(j).
Given any permutation matrix P , we denote by P 0 its unique inverse which satisﬁes P 0P = PP 0 = I ,
where I denotes the inﬁnite identity matrix. P is the set of all permutation matrices. Given a permutation
matrix P 2 P and n 2 N, we denote the n £ n matrix (pij)i;j2f1;2;:::;ng by P (n). A ﬁnite permutation
matrix is a permutation matrix P such that there exists n 2 N such that (Px)+n = x+n. The set of all
ﬁnite permutation matrices is denoted by F .
As in Mitra and Basu (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), we focus on the class of cyclic permutations
which deﬁnes a group under the usual matrix multiplication.7 A permutation matrix P 2 P is said to
be cyclic if, for any unit vector e = (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : :) 2 X , there exists k 2 N such that k-times
repeated application of P to e generates e again, i.e.
kz }| {
P ¢ ¢ ¢P e = e. Throughout the paper, we let Q be
the following subclass of P:
Q =
8><>:P 2 P :
there exists k 2 N such that, for each n 2 N;
P (nk) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation matrix
9>=>; :
6A binary relation % on X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x 2 X , x % x, and (ii) transitive if, for all x; y; z 2 X , x % z holds
whenever x % y and y % z.
7Let G be a set of permutation matrices. G is said to deﬁne a group under the usual matrix multiplication if it satisﬁes the
following four properties: (i) for all P;Q 2 G, PQ 2 G, (ii) there exists I 2 G such that for all P 2 G, IP = PI = P , (iii)
for all P 2 G, there exists P 0 2 G such that P 0P = PP 0 = I , and (iv) for all P;Q;R 2 G, (PQ)R = P (QR).
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It is easily checked thatQ is the class of cyclic permutations and deﬁnes a group (with respect to matrix
multiplication), and also that F µ Q.
Negation of a statement is indicated by the logic symbol :. Our notation for vector inequalities on
X is as follows: for all x; y 2 X , x > y if xi ¸ yi for all i 2 N, and x > y if x > y and x 6= y.
3 Impartiality and consequentialist equity
In this section, we examine the possibility of a strongly Paretian and equitable SWR that satisﬁes an
impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity. We begin with the formal deﬁnition of Strong Pareto.
Strong Pareto (SP): For all x; y 2 X with x > y, x Â y.
The requirement of impartial treatment of generations is usually formalized by using permutations
of generations. In accordance with an adopted class of permutations, different notion of impartiality will
be formalized. We consider the following two alternative impartiality axioms.
F -Anonymity (FA): For all x 2 X and all P 2 F , Px » x.
Q-Anonymity (QA): For all x 2 X and all P 2 Q, Px » x.
FA and QA are also called Finite (or Weak) Anonymity and Fixed Step Anonymity respectively. Since
F µ Q, QA implies FA. It is known that while the anonymity axiom deﬁned in terms of all permu-
tations in P is not compatible with SP, both FA and QA are compatible with SP. SP and FA (resp.
QA) characterize the inﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen grading principle deﬁned in terms of F (resp. Q).8
Furthermore, in Mitra and Basu (2007), they show that Q is the largest class of permutations by which
SP-compatible anonymity axiom can be deﬁned, where we use the term anonymity axiom to refer to the
condition which asserts that Px » x for all x 2 X and all P in an adopted class of permutations.
Although the basic principles of efﬁciency and impartiality formalized by SP and FA or QA are
fairly appealing and intuitive in dealing with intergenerational welfare issues, what they assert on our
intergenerational decision-making is quite weak and may be insufﬁcient to resolve distributional con-
ﬂicts among generations in many cases. To resolve distributional conﬂicts, Asheim and Tungodden
8For the characterizations of the two versions of the inﬁnite-horizon Suppes-Sen grading principle, see Svensson (1980),
Asheim et al. (2001), and Banerjee (2006a).
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(2004) and Bossert et al. (2007) examine the possibility of adding a consequentialist equity axiom in
a strongly Paretian and ﬁnitely anonymous SWR. Asheim and Tungodden (2004) consider the inﬁnite-
horizon extension of Hammond Equity.9 Bossert et al. (2007) also examine a weaker equity axiom
called Pigou-Dalton Equity as well as Hammond Equity.
Pigou-Dalton Equity (PDE): For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) yi < xi · xj < yj
and xi ¡ yi = yj ¡ xj , and (ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x Â y.
Hammond Equity (HE): For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) yi < xi · xj < yj , and
(ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x Â y.
Both two axioms deal with a distributional conﬂict between two generations.10 PDE asserts that an
order-preserving transfer from a relatively better-off generation to a relatively worse-off generation, i.e.
the well-known Pigou-Dalton transfer, is strictly socially preferable. On the other hand, HE asserts that
an order-preserving change which diminishes inequality of utilities between conﬂicting two generations
is strictly socially improving. PDE agrees to such a value judgment by HE as long as utility differences
of conﬂicting two generations are equal. Hence, HE is stronger than PDE.
Bossert et al. (2007) show that SP, FA, and PDE together characterize the inﬁnite-horizon gener-
alized Lorenz criterion and also that the inﬁnite-horizon leximin principle is characterized if PDE is
strengthened to HE. We now present the formal deﬁnitions of these two inﬁnite-horizon SWRs. For all
n 2 N, let %nG denote the ﬁnite-horizon generalized Lorenz SWR deﬁned on Rn: for all x; y 2 Rn,
x %nG y ,
Pk
t=1 x(t) ¸
Pk
t=1 y(t) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; ng
The generalized Lorenz SWR, denoted %G, is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %G y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nG y¡n and x+n > y+n: (1)
We next introduce the leximin SWR. For all n 2 N, let %nL denote the ﬁnite-horizon leximin SWR
9Hammond Equity is originally formulated by Hammond (1976, 1979) in the ﬁnite population case.
10These conditions are generically referred to as two-person equity axioms in the ﬁnite population framework. On this, see
d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002) and Bossert and Weymark (2004).
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deﬁned on Rn: for all x; y 2 Rn,
x %nL y ,
8><>:
x is a permutation of y, or
there existsm 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that x(t) = y(t) for all t < m and x(m) > y(m):
The leximin SWR, denoted %L, is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %L y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nL y¡n and x+n > y+n: (2)
We now formally state the characterizations by Bossert et al. (2007), which will be used to establish
our main results later.
Proposition 1 (Bossert et al. (2007), Theorem 1). A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, FA, and PDE if and
only if %G is a subrelation to %.
Proposition 2 (Bossert et al. (2007), Theorem 2). A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, FA, and HE if and only
if %L is a subrelation to %.
Now, the natural question to ask is whether it is possible to realize the stronger notion of impartiality
formalized as QA in a strongly Paretian and equitable (in the sense of PDE or HE) SWR. This paper
provides a positive answer to this question. We deﬁne Q-anonymous extensions of the generalized
Lorenz and the leximin SWRs in the same way as Banerjee (2006a) does for the Suppes-Sen SWR and
the utilitarian SWR (see our Section 4).11 TheQ-generalized Lorenz criterion, denoted %QG, is deﬁned
as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QG y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %G y: (3)
The Q-leximin principle %QL is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QL y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %L y: (4)
In what follows, we refer to Banerjee’s (2006a) way of extension as Q-extension. As will be shown
later, each of the Q-extensions of the generalized Lorenz SWR and the leximin SWR is also well-
11It should be noted that Q-anonymous SWRs are also proposed in Lauwers (1997b) and by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).
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deﬁned as a SWR on X , and the former satisﬁes all the axioms of SP, QA, and PDE and the latter
satisﬁesHE as well as these three axioms. Thus, these twoQ-extensions not only provide the resolution
to the distributional conﬂicts among generations but also realize the stronger notion of impartiality, QA,
than FA in the intergenerational welfare evaluation, i.e. can be the resolution to both two problems we
mentioned earlier.
Once the possibility of a strongly Paretian, Q-anonymous and equitable SWR is established, we
should proceed to specify the class of those SWRs in the next step. Our main theorems provide the
characterizations of the classes of SWRs that satisfy SP, QA, and PDE or HE.
Theorem 1. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and PDE if and only if %QG is a subrelation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Theorem 2. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and HE if and only if %QL is a subrelation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
As discussed by Basu and Mitra (2007) and Banerjee (2006a), the theorems 1 and 2 are interpreted
as saying that %QG (resp. %QL) is the least restrictive SWR among all the SWRs that satisfy SP, QA,
and PDE (resp. HE). Formally, for all x; y 2 X , we have
x %QG y if and only if x % y for all %2 ¥QG; (5)
and
x %QL y if and only if x % y for all %2 ¥QL; (6)
where ¥QG (resp. ¥QL) is the set of all SWRs that satisfy SP, QA, and PDE (resp. HE). The only if
part of (5) (resp. (6)) is obvious from the only if statement of Theorem 1 (resp. Theorem 2). The if part
of (5) (resp. (6)) is also straightforward from the fact that %QG2 ¥QG (resp. %QL2 ¥QL).
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4 An alternative characterization ofQ-utilitarian SWR
From Theorems 1 and 2, the difference between the Q-generalized Lorenz and the Q-leximin SWRs
can be explained in terms of their consequentialist equity properties, PDE and HE. Another plausible
SWR that satisﬁes both of SP and QA is the Q-extension of the utilitarian SWR proposed by Banerjee
(2006a) under the nameQ-utilitarian SWR. He characterizes it in terms of SP,QA, and an informational
invariance axiom called Partial Translation Scale Invariance (PTSI).12 In view of Banerjee’s (2006a)
result, our characterizations of the Q-generalized Lorenz and the Q-leximin SWRs are also interpreted
as showing the possibility of adding the consequentialist equity axioms in the strongly Paretian and Q-
anonymous SWRs and also as saying that the admissible SWRs will considerably change if we impose
the equity axiom, PDE or HE, instead of the invariance axiom PTSI. Now, if we obtain the characteri-
zation of the Q-utilitarian SWR using a consequentialist equity axiom, it will be of much help to those
who want to compare the three strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs, the Q-generalized Lorenz,
the Q-leximin, and the Q-utilitarian SWRs, in terms of their consequentialist equity properties. In this
section, we provide an alternative characterization of the Q-utilitarian using an equity axiom.
We begin with the formal deﬁnitions of the utilitarian SWR and its Q-extension. Let %nU denote the
ﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWR deﬁned on Rn: for all x; y 2 Rn,
x %nU y ,
Pn
i=1 xi ¸
Pn
i=1 yi:
The utilitarian SWR %U is deﬁned by combining the ﬁnite-horizon utilitarian SWR and the Pareto
criterion: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %U y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %nU y¡n and x+n > y+n: (7)
The Q-utilitarian SWR %QU is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %QU y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px %U y: (8)
12PTSI is also called Partial Unit Comparability and is deﬁned as: for all x; y 2 X , ® 2 RN, and n 2 N, if x+n = y+n
and x % y then x + ® % y + ®. For the detailed discussion about the invariance axioms, we refer the reader to Bossert and
Weymark (2004) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (2002).
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We now introduce an equity axiom which is stated for two-generation conﬂicting situations similar
to those considered in PDE and HE.13
Incremental Equity (IE): For all x; y 2 X , if there exist i; j 2 N such that (i) xi ¡ yi = yj ¡ xj , and
(ii) xk = yk for all k 2 N n fi; jg, then x » y.
In contrast to PDE, this axiom asserts that, for any transfer among two generations, the initial utility
stream and the post-transfer stream are considered to be equally good without any reference to the rela-
tive utility levels of conﬂicting two generations. Thus, IE is interpreted as requiring the intergenerational
decision making to be neutral with respect to utility transfer among two generations. Since a transposi-
tion of two generations’ utilities is a special case of utility transfer between two generations, IE implies
FA.14
The following proposition tells that IE clearly distinguishes the SWRs including the utilitarian SWR
as a subrelation from the other strongly Paretian SWRs.15
Proposition 3. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP and IE if and only if %U is a subrelation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
We now move to the characterization of theQ-utilitarian SWR. As shown in the following theorem,
when we strengthen the notion of impartiality by additionally imposing QA, the Q-utilitarian SWR is
the least restrictive SWR among the admissible ones.
Theorem 3. A SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and IE if and only if %QU is a subrelation to %.
Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Theorems 1 to 3 together tell us how admissible SWRs will change in accordance with which of the
equity axioms, PDE, HE, and IE, is additionally imposed on the strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous
SWRs. Table 1 summarizes the characterizations in this paper and compares them with those established
by Banerjee (2006a), Basu and Mitra (2007), and Bossert et al. (2007). For each row in Table 1, the
class of SWRs that satisfy the axioms indicated by © is characterized as the one composed of all SWRs
13IE was ﬁrst proposed by Blackorby et al. (2002) in a ﬁnite population framework. See also d’Aspremont and Gevers
(2002) and Blackorby et al. (2005).
14Note that any ﬁnite permutation is equivalently represented as ﬁnite composition of transpositions.
15In Basu and Mitra (2007), %U is also characterized in terms of SP, FA, and PTSI.
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including the SWR in the ﬁrst column as a subrelation, and furthermore, each rule out of the class
satisﬁes (resp. violates) the axioms indicated by + (resp. –). Compared to the characterizations in
Bossert et al. (2007), our results are regarded as establishing (i) the possibility of reﬂecting the stronger
notion of impartiality than FA in strongly Paretian and equitable SWRs, and compared to Banerjee’s
(2006a) work, (ii) the possibility of realizing the consequentialist equities in strongly Paretian and Q-
anonymous SWRs.
Table 1: Characterizations of F-anonymous SWRs and their Q-extensions
SWR efﬁciency impartiality equity invariance
(least restrictive) SP FA QA PDE HE IE PTSI characterized in ...
Q-G-Lorenz %QG © + © © – – Theorem 1
G-Lorenz %G © © © – – Theorem 1 in Bossert et al. (2007)
Q-Leximin %QL © + © + © – – Theorem 2
Leximin %L © © + © – – Theorem 2 in Bossert et al. (2007)
Q-Utilitarian %QU
n ©
©
+
+
©
©
–
–
–
–
©
+
+
©
Theorem 3
Theorem 3 in Banerjee (2006a)
Utilitarian %U
n ©
©
+
©
–
–
–
–
©
+
+
©
Proposition 3
Theorem 1 in Basu and Mitra (2007)
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the possibility of adding the strong impartiality axiom formalized as QA
in strongly Paretian and equitable SWRs, and we obtained positive results. In particular, we show that
the Q-extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR is characterized with SP, QA, and PDE and the Q-
extension of the Leximin SWR in terms of SP, QA, and HE. We also characterize the Q-utilitarian
SWR using the equity axiom IE. Our characterizations together show how the admissible SWRs will
change in accordance with which of the equity axioms, PDE, HE, and IE, is additionally imposed
on the strongly Paretian and Q-anonymous SWRs. From Arrow’s (1963) variant of Szpilrajn’s (1930)
theorem, we can conclude that there exists an ordering onX which satisﬁes SP, the axiom of efﬁciency,
QA, the axiom of impartiality, and PDE,HE, or IE, the axioms of consequentialist equity. These results
provide plausible resolutions to the existing impossibilities of an impartial or equitable social welfare
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ordering (SWO) obtained by Diamond (1965), Banerjee (2006b), and Hara et al. (forthcoming) and also
strengthen the resolution in Bossert et al. (2007) established with the weaker impartiality requirement
FA.16
We should also note that, compared to the results obtained with FA, incompleteness of the least
restrictive SWR is improved in the class characterized with QA. The recent contribution by Mitra and
Basu (2007) provides an important suggestion about further research to be carried out on this issue. As
shown in their paper, a group of cyclic permutation matrices Q is the largest class of permutations in
terms of which the SP-compatible anonymity axiom is well-deﬁned. Consequently, in the presence of
SP, it is impossible to strengthen the notion of impartiality further than QA. And moreover, if we think
of SP and QA as indispensable requirements to be satisﬁed in the intergenerational welfare evaluation,
more comparable social evaluation would be possible only by strengthening the axioms other thanQA or
employing additional axioms. The preference-continuity axiom considered in Asheim and Tungodden
(2004) or the axiom of consistency proposed by Basu and Mitra (2007) seems to be a plausible candidate
for the axiom to be additionally imposed. The issue of the possibility of additionally employing these
axioms is left for future research.
Appendix
We begin with two important lemmata that shed light on properties of theQ-extension of aF-anonymous
SWR. Each of the lemmata is stated for the class of SWRs that satisfy three basic properties common
to %G, %L, and %U . Note that each of %G, %L, and %U is deﬁned in terms of the Pareto criterion
and the sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs, (%nG)1n=1, (%nL)1n=1, and (%nU )1n=1 respectively. Each of the
sequences satisﬁes the following properties:17
Property 1 (P1): For all n 2 N and all x; y 2 Rn with x > y, x Ân y;
Property 2 (P2): For all n 2 N, all r 2 R, and all x; y 2 Rn, x %n y ) (x; r) %n+1 (y; r);
16In Banerjee (2006b), a SWO is required to be representable as the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function, and in
Diamond (1965) and Hara et al. (forthcoming) a certain continuity axiom is imposed on a SWO.
17P1 is the ﬁnite-horizon version of SP. P2 is a kind of separability requirement similar to Extended Independence of the
Utilities of Unconcerned Individuals (or Existence Independence) introduced by Blackorby et al. (2002, 2005) in the frame-
work of variable population social choice, which requires our evaluation to be independent of the addition of an unconcerned
generation. P3 is a well-known anonymity axiom in a ﬁnite-horizon framework.
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Property 3 (P3): For all n 2 N and all x; y 2 Rn, if x is a permutation of y, then x »n y.
The lemmata are stated for the class of inﬁnite-horizon SWRs, denoted ¥, each of which is deﬁned in
terms of a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs satisfying P1, P2, and P3 and of the Pareto crietrion. We
now formally deﬁne the class ¥. Let (%n)n2N be a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs which consists
of one ﬁnite-horizon SWR %n for each possible length of time horizon n 2 N. Let S be the set of
all possible sequences of ﬁnite-horizon SWRs (%n)n2N that satisﬁes the properties P1 to P3. For each
(%n)n2N 2 S, we can associate a binary relation % on X as follows: for any x; y 2 X ,
x % y , there exists n 2 N such that x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n:18 (9)
Let ' denote the mapping that associates to any sequence (%n)n2N in S a binary relation on X deﬁned
in (9). We deﬁne ¥ as
¥ = '(S);
i.e. the set of binary relations onX each of which is associated with a sequence of ﬁnite-horizon relation
(%n)n2N 2 S in a way of (9). As will be shown in Claim 1, every binary relation in ¥ is well-deﬁned as
a SWR onX . Moreover, by P3 and (9), each % in ¥ is F-anonymous. For each %2 ¥, its Q-extension,
denoted %Q, is deﬁned as follows: for all x; y 2 X ,
x %Q y , there exists P 2 Q such that Px % y: (10)
We are ready to state the following lemmata. We owe a lot to Banerjee’s (2006a) work in establishing
the lemmata. Our results are regarded as the generalizations of his results established for the Suppes-Sen
and the utilitarian SWRs.
Lemma 1. For all %2 ¥, its Q-extension %Q is also a SWR on X .
18d’Aspremont (2007) refers to this type of binary relation as simpliﬁed criterion.
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Lemma 2. For all %2 ¥, its Q-extension %Q has the following property: for any x; y 2 X ,(
x ÂQ y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â y; (11a)
x »Q y if and only if there exists P 2 Q such that Px » y: (11b)
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds through two claims.
Claim 1. For all %2 ¥, % is reﬂexive and transitive, i.e. well-deﬁned as a SWR on X .
Proof of Claim 1. Reﬂexivity is straightforward. To conﬁrm % is transitive, consider any x; y; z 2 X
such that x % y and y % z. We will show x % z holds. By (9), there exist n; n0 2 N such that
(i) x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n and (ii) y¡n0 %n0 z¡n0 and y+n0 > z+n0 . Let ¹n = maxfn; n0g.
We demonstrate the proof for the case of ¹n = n0. The same argument can be applied to the case of
¹n = n. Notice that x+¹n > z+¹n. Thus, we are enough to show that x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n. By P2, x¡n %n y¡n
implies (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n) %¹n y¡¹n. By P1, x¡¹n %¹n (x¡n; yn+1; : : : ; y¹n). Since %¹n is transitive,
x¡¹n %¹n y¡¹n holds, which together with y¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n and the transitivity of %¹n give x¡¹n %¹n z¡¹n.
Claim 2. For any %2 ¥, we have the following: for any P 2 Q and any x; y 2 X ,
(
x Â y if and only if Px Â Py; (12a)
x » y if and only if Px » Py: (12b)
Proof of Claim 2. We will show that x % y if and only if Px % Py, from which the equivalence
assertions in (12a) and (12b) immediately follow.
(only if part) Assume x % y. By (9), there exists n 2 N such that
x¡n %n y¡n and x+n > y+n: (13)
Take P 2 Q arbitrarily. We want to show that Px % Py. Without loss of generality, let P be a k-period
cyclic permutation matrix. Then, we can ﬁnd n^ 2 N such that (i) kn^ ¸ n and (ii) P (kn^) is a ﬁnite
dimensional permutation matrix. Let ¹n = kn^, and consider the following proﬁles w; z 2 X:
w = (x¡¹n; (Px)+¹n) and z = (y¡¹n; (Py)+¹n):
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From the deﬁnitions of w and z and (13), it follows that
w¡n %n z¡n and w+n = (xn+1; : : : ; x¹n; (Px)+¹n) > (yn+1; : : : ; y¹n; (Py)+¹n) = z+n.
Thus, by (9), w % z. Note that, by (9) and P3, % satisﬁes FA. By FA, w » Px and z » Py. Since, by
Claim 1, % is transitive, Px % Py is obtained as desired.
(if part) Assume Px % Py. Since P 0 2 Q, we obtain x = P 0(Px) % P 0(Py) = y by the “only if”
part of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1. Take %2 ¥ arbitrarily and let %Q be its Q-extension. Reﬂexivity is straightforward
from the fact that I 2 Q and % is reﬂexive. We show that %Q is transitive. Assume that x %Q y
and y %Q z. Then, by (10), there exist P;Q 2 Q such that Px % y and Qy % z. By Claim 2,
Px % y , Q(Px) % Qy. By Claim 1, % is transitive, and thus Q(Px) % z holds. Since QP 2 Q,
x %Q z follows from (10). ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we prove the equivalence assertion in (11a). Note that, by the deﬁniton of
%Q, x ÂQ y is equivalent to
8>><>>:
9P 2 Q such that Px % y (14a)
and
8Q 2 Q;:(Qy % x): (14b)
(only if part of (11a)) Assume x ÂQ y. The proof is done by contradiction. Suppose that there is no
P 2 Q such that Px Â y, or equivalently, such that Px % y and :(y % Px). From (14a), there exists
P 2 Q such that Px % y. Thus, for this P 2 Q, we must have Px % y and y % Px, i.e. Px » y.
Then, by (12b), we have x = P 0(Px) » P 0y, which contradicts (14b).
(if part of (11a)) Assume that there exists P 2 Q such that Px Â y. By (10), x %Q y. We want
to show :(y %Q x). We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that y %Q x holds. Then, by (10), there
exists Q 2 Q such that Qy % x. By Claim 2, P (Qy) % Px. Let R denote the product PQ. Since % is
16
transitive, Px Â y and Ry % Px give Ry Â y. Then, by (9), there exists n 2 N such that
(Ry)¡n %n y¡n and (Ry)+n > y+n.
Note that R belongs toQ. Without loss of generality, let R be a k-period cyclic permutation matrix, i.e.,
for any n^ 2 N, R(kn^) is a ﬁnite-dimensional permutation matrix. Consider ¹n 2 N such that ¹n ¸ n and
¹n = kn^ for some n^ 2 N. By P3 and the fact that ¹n ¸ n, we have
(Ry)¡¹n »¹n y¡¹n and (Ry)+¹n > y+¹n.
If we have (Ry)+¹n = y+¹n, Ry » y follows, and this contradicts Ry Â y. But, in the case of (Ry)+¹n >
y+¹n, we can ﬁnd m 2 N such that (Ry¹n+1; : : : ; Ryk(n^+m)) > (y¹n+1; : : : ; yk(n^+m)), which contradicts
the fact that R is a k-period cyclic permutation matrix. Thus, in either case, we obtain a contradiction.
Next, we prove the equivalence assertion in (11b).
(only if part of (11b)) Assume x »Q y. Then, by (10), we can ﬁnd P 2 Q such that Px % y. If we
had Px Â y, it would follow from (11a) that x ÂQ y holds, which contradicts x »Q y. Thus, we must
have Px » y.
(if part of (11b)) Assume that there exists P 2 Q such that Px » y. Then, by (10), we have x %Q y.
Moreover, by (12b), x = P 0(Px) » P 0y holds. Then, by (10) again, we also obtain y %Q x. Thus,
x »Q y follows. ¥
We now provide the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. (only if part) Assume that a SWR % on X satisﬁes SP, QA, and PDE. Since QA
implies FA, it follows from Proposition 1 that %G is a subrelation to %. First, we show that if x ÂQG y
then x Â y. Assume x ÂQG y. By (11a), there exists P 2 Q such that Px ÂG y. Since %G is a
subrelation to %, Px Â y holds. By QA, x » Px. By the transitivity of %, x Â y follows. Next,
assume x »QG y. We want to show x » y. By (11b), there exists P 2 Q such that Px »G y. Since
%G is a subrelation to %, Px » y. By QA, x » Px. The transitivity of % gives x » y.
(if part) Assume that %QG is a subrelation to %. From Lemma 2 and the fact that I 2 Q, %G is a
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subrelation to %QG, which means that %G is a subrelation to %. Thus, from Proposition 1, % satisﬁes
SP and PDE. As for QA, it is checked as follows. Since %G is reﬂexive, x = P 0(Px) »G x holds for
any x 2 X and any P 2 Q. By (11b), Px »QG x. Since %QG is a subrelation to %, Px » x. ¥
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Proposition 2, the only if part is proved in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 1. The if part is also proved by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1. ¥
Next, we prove Proposition 3 and Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. The if part is straightforward and we omit it. We prove the only if part in two
steps.
Step 1.19 We show that x » y holds whenever there exists n 2 N such that Pni=1 xi = Pni=1 yi
and x+n = y+n. The case of n = 1 is trivial. If n ¸ 2, consider the following operation: ﬁx
¹n 2 f1; : : : ; n ¡ 1g arbitrarily and construct ¹x 2 X as follows: ¹x¹n = y¹n for ¹n; ¹xn = xn + x¹n ¡ y¹n
for n; ¹xk = xk for all k 2 N n f¹n; ng. By IE, x » ¹x. Applying the above operation once for each
¹n 2 f1; : : : ; n ¡ 1g repeatedly, we can construct the proﬁle y from x. Then, the transitivity of % gives
x » y.
Step 2. From Step 1 and (7), it is obvious that if x »U y then x » y. We show that if x ÂU y then
x Â y. Assume x ÂU y. By (7), there exists n 2 N such that (
Pn
i=1 xi; x
+n) > (
Pn
i=1 yi; y
+n). Then,
we can ﬁnd ¹n ¸ n such that
P¹n
i=1 xi >
P¹n
i=1 yi and x
+¹n > y+¹n.
Take z 2 X such that z1 = y1 +
P¹n
i=1(xi ¡ yi), zi = yi for all i 2 f2; 3; : : : ; ¹ng, and zj = xj for all
j 2 f¹n+ 1; : : : g. From Step 1, x » z follows. By SP, z Â y. The transitivity of % gives x Â y. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3. Using Proposition 3, the proof is done in the same way as in the proof of Theorem
1. ¥
19The result demonstrated in this step is well-known fact. See, for example, Blackorby et al. (2002, 2005) for the ﬁnite
population case, and also Asheim and Tungodden (2004) for the inﬁnite-horizon case.
18
References
Arrow KJ (1963) Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York
Asheim GB, Buchholz W, Tungodden B (2001) Justifying sustainability. J Environ Econ Manage 41:
252-268
Asheim GB, Tungodden B (2004) Resolving distributional conﬂicts between generations. Econ Theory
24: 221-230
Banerjee K (2006a) On the extension of the utilitarian and Suppes-Sen social welfare relations to inﬁnite
utility streams. Soc Choice Welfare 27: 327-339
Banerjee K (2006b) On the equity-efﬁciency trade off in aggregating inﬁnite utility streams. Econ Lett
93: 63-67
Basu K, Mitra T (2007) Utilitarianism for inﬁnite utility streams: a new welfare criterion and its ax-
iomatic characterization. J Econ Theory 133: 350-373
Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (2002) Utilitarianism and the theory of justice. In: Arrow KJ, Sen
AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare vol. I. North-Holland, Amsterdam,
pp. 543-596
Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (2005) Population issues in social choice theory, welfare eco-
nomics, and ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bossert W, Sprumont Y, Suzumura K (2007) Ordering inﬁnite utility streams. J Econ Theory 135: 579-
589
Bossert W, Weymark JA (2004) Utility in social choice. In: Barbara S, Hammond P, Seidl C (eds)
Handbook of utility theory, Extensions, vol 2. Kluwer, Boston, pp. 1099-1177
d’Aspremont C (2007) Formal welfarism and intergenerational equity. In: Roemer J, Suzumura K (eds)
Intergenerational equity and sustainability. Palgrave, London, pp. 113-130
19
d’Aspremont C, Gevers L (2002) Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability. In: Arrow
KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare vol. I. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, pp. 459-541
Diamond P (1965) The evaluation of inﬁnite utility streams. Econometrica 33: 170-177
Fleurbaey M, Michel P (2003) Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion. J Math
Econ 39: 777-802
Hammond PJ (1976) Equity, Arrow’s conditions, and Rawls’ difference principle. Econometrica 44:
793-804
Hammond PJ (1979) Equity in two person situations – some consequences. Econometrica 47: 1127-
1135
Hara C, Shinotsuka T, Suzumura K, Xu Y (forthcoming) Continuity and egalitarianism in the evaluation
of inﬁnite utility streams. Soc Choice Welfare
Lauwers L (1997a) Rawlsian equity and generalised utilitarianism with and inﬁnite population. Econ
Theory 9: 143-150
Lauwers L (1997b) Inﬁnite utility: insisting on strong monotonicity. Aust J Philos 75: 222-233
van Liedekerke L (1995) Should utilitarians be cautious about an inﬁnite future. Aust J Philos 73: 405-
407
Mitra T (2005) Intergenerational equity and the forest management problem. In: Kant S, Berry AR (eds)
Economics, sustainability, and Natural resources: Economics of sustainable forest management.
Springer, Dordrecht, pp. 137-173
Mitra T, Basu K (2007) On the existence of Paretian social welfare quasi-orderings for inﬁnite utility
streams with extended anonymity. In: Roemer J, Suzumura K (eds) Intergenerational equity and
sustainability. Palgrave, London, pp. 85-99
Sen AK (1970) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day, Amsterdam
20
Suppes P (1966) Some formal models of grading principles. Synthese 6: 284-306
Svensson LG (1980) Equity among generations. Econometrica 48: 1251-1256
Szpilrajn E (1930) Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel. Fundam Math 16: 386-389
21
